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of any kind. If Ajax should appear, the Greeks would cower. He is an *αἰετός*, they *ὄρνιθες*; but it is an implied, not an expressed comparison. There is no allusion to the Homeric *αἰγυπιοὶ γαμφώνυχες ἀγκυλοχεῖλαι*; and there is no ellipsis in the beginning of the sentence, as many scholars have thought.

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EMENDATION OF OLYMPIODORUS *Scholia in Platonis Phaedonem*
(Finckh, p. 39, l. 9)

“οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρία τοῖς οὕτω.” ὀνομαζομένη, ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν. ὀνόματος γὰρ μόνου κοινού μετέχουσιν, ἡ περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα διαφερόμενοι: So the MSS. Finckh suggests “fortasse ἡ delendum.” A better remedy is to read οἱ περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα διαφερόμενοι. It is another case of *iotacism*. See *Classical Philology*, I, 81. Olympiodorus is perhaps thinking of such Platonic passages as *Sophist* 218 C: νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ τε κἀγὼ τοῦτου πέρι τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον, etc.

PAUL SHOREY

NOTE ON ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* 1086b, 32–37

ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· οὐ γὰρ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. δῆλον δ' ἔκ τε τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τῶν ὀρισμῶν· οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς, εἰ μὴ πᾶν τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς, οὐδ' ὅτι ὁδὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον.

The most recent translator, Ross, renders this [*italics mine*]: “Again, the elements will not be even knowable; for they are not universal and knowledge is of universals. This is clear both from demonstrations and from definitions; for we do not conclude that this triangle has its angles equal to two right angles *unless* every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, nor that this man is an animal *unless* every man is an animal.”

The German translator Lasson (p. 266) and all modern interpreters known to me take the passage in the same way. It is the natural interpretation, so long as we think in terms of modern logic and idiom. From the point of view of Aristotelian logic and Greek idiom it is improbable and, I believe, almost demonstrably wrong.

Note first that Aristotle does not merely say that knowledge is *derived* from universal (propositions). He says it is *of* universals, as is proved by definitions and demonstrations. Now definitions and syllogistic demonstrations are elsewhere associated in the same way: *Met.* 1039b, 27 ff.; *Analyt. Post.* 75b, 31. Their common feature is not merely that they depend upon, but that they are concerned with τὸ καθόλου, are *of* it. This is obviously so in the case of the definition. We do not define the particular or the